UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/381
28 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FINAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 900 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint, for a limited period, a senior civilian official who would draw up an overall assessment and plan of action for the restoration of essential public services in the various opstinas of Sarajevo, other than the city of Pale, and who would assist the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in close coordination with all relevant local authorities, in the implementation of the plan. In accordance with that resolution, the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo was established in April 1994 in order to mobilize and coordinate international support for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo. On 29 March 1994, I appointed Mr. William Eagleton to the position of Special Coordinator. During the following two years, the Special Coordinator prepared a Plan of Action and assisted the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuing the various projects of the Plan of Action. As required by the resolution, a voluntary trust fund was established to receive contributions from Governments and other donors. After two years of operation, often in the most difficult circumstances, the Office closed on 30 April 1996, and its remaining functions have been transferred to appropriate successor organizations. This report is submitted to apprise the Council of the work of the Office of the Special Coordinator during the last two years and of the arrangements made to ensure continuity of its functions following its closure.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN OF ACTION TO RESTORE ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN SARAJEVO

2. During the initial months of the Special Coordinator's operations, progress was rapid. On 25 May 1994, an organizational donors' conference was held at Vienna. On 1 June 1994, the Plan of Action called for in resolution 900 (1994) was published under the title "Restoring life to Sarajevo". The Plan identified 144 projects across 14 sectors, including electricity, water, gas, energy and heating, civil engineering, health, municipal services and city development, and education. Cost estimates amounted to some US$ 254 million for urgent work and US$ 285 million for transitional projects. At the pledging conference held in

New York in June 1994, 27 donor States pledged $95 million for the Plan of Action, including more than $20 million for the United Nations Trust Fund. Of these pledged funds, $18.1 million have been deposited in the Trust Fund, while $3.2 million are still outstanding.

3. Both Security Council resolution 900 (1994) and the Plan of Action were based on the assumption that there would be a stable cease-fire and freedom of movement into the city for the materials and personnel required to implement restoration works. Indeed, it was the positive developments in February 1994, and in particular the agreements on a cease-fire and measures related to heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo that were concluded on 9 February 1994, that had prompted the establishment of the Office of the Special Coordinator. Unfortunately, these assumptions turned out to be overly optimistic. Despite an encouraging start, the rapid deterioration of the security situation following rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact Group Plan in June 1994 severely hampered implementation of the projects identified in the Plan of Action. This, rather than a shortage of funds, was the major impediment to the rapid realization of the ambitious goals set out in the Plan of Action.

4. In July 1994, the Bosnian Serb side suspended an agreement that had permitted some supplies to reach the city across the airport. For almost all the time between then and the Dayton Peace Agreement of November 1995 the work of the Office was dominated by problems of access to the city, with the airport and land routes effectively closed for extended periods. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb side at various times reduced or completely cut supplies of water, gas or electricity to the city. The Office of the Special Coordinator played a major role in coordinating the collective effort to keep the utilities and other essential functions operating. Contacts with the parties to the conflict were maintained, and this helped to ensure a fairly steady, though not always adequate, flow of gas, water and electricity during the winter months. In addition, bringing the parties together to discuss the sharing of utilities helped foster a more conducive climate for eventual reconciliation and prepared the ground for the rapid restoration of utilities and other essential services once the peace settlement had been achieved. At the same time, the Office mobilized international financial resources and technical know-how to develop alternative emergency sources of water and energy to bridge those periods when the supplies were interrupted for political reasons.

5. The Office of the Special Coordinator also provided the focal point and formal structures through which the restoration effort was coordinated, and where interested parties could be consulted about priorities and be informed of progress. The work of the Office was carried out through seven action groups, encompassing all 14 sectors of the Plan of Action. Each action group was headed by a manager, who worked in conjunction with a counterpart from the Directorate of the Reconstruction and Development of Sarajevo, an organ of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in cooperation with all relevant local authorities. A coordination committee, bringing together the Government, municipal officials, the Directorate of the Reconstruction and Development of Sarajevo, members of the diplomatic community and representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations and non-governmental organizations, met every two or three weeks in Sarajevo to discuss and coordinate work on the Plan of Action. The dialogue thus established with the

international donor community was essential in sustaining the restoration effort and in attracting financial support for the projects in the Plan of Action. Further donor meetings were held at Vienna in September 1994 and June 1995. Two years after the opening of the Office of the Special Coordinator, large parts of the Plan of Action have been implemented or are under way, with a concomitant improvement in the quality of life for the citizens of Sarajevo. The Plan of Action has also been the starting-point for much of the reconstruction work in Sarajevo, which is now being developed by the World Bank and the European Community.

6. Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995, implementation of the Plan of Action has accelerated considerably. As of 15 April 1996, nearly $100 million has been made available for 285 projects. In addition, assistance in kind by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and, more recently, the Implementation Force (IFOR) military engineering assets, valued at $30 million at least, has been provided by troop-contributing nations, mainly for emergency repairs to utilities installations, roads and bridges. Many of these projects are ongoing and will require further funding by the international community as part of the reconstruction plan.

7. The Office of the Special Coordinator has prepared a detailed technical report on the status of the implementation of the Plan of Action as of 15 April 1996. This report identifies work in progress, the resources available and the agencies responsible for implementation of the various projects, together with the outstanding projects that need new resources. The report, a valuable tool for those involved in the future reconstruction of Sarajevo, has been forwarded to the World Bank, the European Commission, representatives of donor States, international agencies, governmental representatives, city authorities, non-governmental organizations and other interested parties.

8. Although a large part of the work under the Plan of Action has been implemented by donor States through bilateral arrangements, a significant amount has been carried out through the United Nations Trust Fund administered by the Office of the Special Coordinator. The establishment of effective financial control mechanisms for the Trust Fund to provide accountability, while allowing funds to be disbursed quickly enough to meet the urgent needs of the city of Sarajevo, presented a considerable initial challenge. However, the systems developed enabled projects to be evaluated and funded within an acceptable time, and also permitted the necessary consultations with donor States. As already noted, these States pledged nearly $20 million to the Trust Fund, making possible the implementation of 55 projects across all sectors of the Plan of Action, particularly in the utilities sectors and in the restoration of health and educational buildings.

9. Additionally, a quick impact fund was established in 1995 to provide small grants (not exceeding $15,000) for emergency works. Some $2.4 million have been disbursed through the quick impact fund on nearly 200 inexpensive but vital projects. During the first few months of 1996, the quick impact fund provided a bridge between the original restoration work and the current, much larger, reconstruction efforts. During the period when Sarajevo was being reunited under Federation control, the quick impact fund provided virtually the only

source of immediate funding for projects aimed at repairing vital communications and transport links and utility supplies, and reviving municipal services. The quick impact fund also demonstrated the commitment of the international community to a unified, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Sarajevo by expeditiously funding a variety of projects for all communities.

10. Since January 1996, the Office of the Special Coordinator has been assisting the Office of the High Representative by convening a series of meetings of sub-groups of the Joint Civilian Commission for Sarajevo to discuss modalities for reuniting the city in terms of utilities and essential public services. The Office has also been actively involved in discussions with the World Bank and the European Commission to ensure a smooth transition to the reconstruction phase.

11. The activities of the Office, which consisted of eight United Nations officers including the Special Coordinator, were enhanced by the willingness of donor States to provide technical staff by way of secondment. The International Management Group, funded mainly by the European Community Humanitarian Office, the United Kingdom-Overseas Development Agency, the Governments of Sweden, France and Italy, UNPROFOR, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Region Ile de France, have all provided the Special Coordinator with experts to manage the work in the various sectors of the Plan of Action. Without this assistance from many sources, the Office would not have had the technical capacity required for its operations.

III. OBSERVATIONS

12. The Security Council, in its resolution 900 (1994), called upon the Secretary-General to appoint the Special Coordinator for a limited period. During most of that period, the parties remained engaged in armed conflict and Sarajevo was effectively under siege. It is widely acknowledged in Sarajevo that the joint international effort to keep essential utilities functioning and begin the restoration of the city's physical infrastructure made a real difference by enabling the citizens of Sarajevo to survive, particularly during winter months, and by giving them hope for the future. The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement opened a new era in which the restoration of the essential public services in Sarajevo has been supplanted by a comprehensive international effort to help reconstruct the whole of the country.

13. The work initiated by the Office of the Special Coordinator will continue after the closure of the Office, as implementing agencies and contractors complete Trust Fund projects. The management of the Trust Fund, including the quick impact fund, has been transferred to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Sarajevo. He will be assisted by the Special Coordinator's programme officer and two locally recruited assistants to ensure proper accounting, reporting and continuity through to project completion. The costs of this small team will be met from the support costs generated by Trust Fund projects. The status report of 15 April 1996 and files of the Office of the Special Coordinator have been made available to those international financial institutions and aid organizations

that are working in Sarajevo. Thus the closure of the Office of the Special Coordinator will occur as part of a smooth transition from restoration to reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14. In conclusion, I wish to place on record my appreciation for the sterling performance of Mr. William Eagleton and his staff. Their competence and dedication helped the citizens of Sarajevo to survive the most difficult period of that city's history. I also pay tribute to the Governments and organizations that have so generously contributed to the Plan of Action.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/382
28 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 May 1996 (S/1996/343),

Noting the views expressed by the Government of Morocco as set out in the report of the Secretary-General and in the memorandum attached to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General dated 10 May 1996 (S/1996/345),

Noting also the views expressed by the Polisario Front as set out in the report of the Secretary-General and in the memorandum attached to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General dated 23 May 1996 (S/1996/366),

Noting also the letter dated 23 May 1996 from the Current Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (S/1996/376),

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just and lasting solution to the question of Western Sahara,

Stressing the importance it attaches to the maintenance of the cease-fire, as an integral part of the Settlement Plan,

Recognizing that, despite all the difficulties, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has to date identified more than 60,000 persons,

Reiterating that, for progress to be achieved, the two parties must have a vision of the post-referendum period,

1. Reiterates its commitment to the holding, as soon as possible, of a free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the Settlement Plan which has been accepted by the two parties referred to above;

2. Deeply regrets the fact that the required willingness does not exist to give MINURSO the cooperation needed for it to resume and complete the identification process, and that there has therefore been no significant progress towards implementation of the Settlement Plan;

3. Agrees with the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the identification process be suspended until such time as both parties provide concrete and convincing evidence that they are committed to resuming and completing it without further obstacles, in accordance with the Settlement Plan;

4. Supports the proposal of the Secretary-General to reduce the strength of the military component of MINURSO by 20 per cent, on the understanding that this will not impair its operational effectiveness in monitoring the cease-fire;

5. Endorses the view of the Secretary-General that the decision to suspend temporarily the work of the Identification Commission and to reduce the number of civilian police and military personnel does not imply any lessening of resolve to secure the implementation of the Settlement Plan;

6. Supports the proposal of the Secretary-General, in the context of the Settlement Plan, to maintain a political office to continue the dialogue with the parties and the two neighbouring countries and to facilitate any other effort that could help set the parties on a course towards an agreed formula for the resolution of their differences and encourages the Secretary-General to consider ways of strengthening the role of this office;

7. Urges the two parties to demonstrate without further delay the political will, cooperation and flexibility necessary to permit the resumption and early completion of the identification process and the implementation of the Settlement Plan; notes with satisfaction that the parties have respected the cease-fire, which is an integral part of the Settlement Plan, and calls upon them to continue to do so;

8. Also calls upon the parties, as a demonstration of good will, to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of certain aspects of the Settlement Plan, such as the release of Saharan political prisoners and the exchange of prisoners of war on humanitarian grounds, as soon as possible, to accelerate implementation of the Settlement Plan in its entirety;

9. Encourages the parties to consider additional ways to create confidence between themselves in order to remove obstacles to implementation of the Settlement Plan;

10. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO, on the basis proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 8 May 1996, until 30 November 1996;

11. Reminds the parties that if significant progress is not achieved during this period, the Council will have to consider other measures, including possible further reductions in the strength of MINURSO, but stresses its readiness to support the resumption of the identification process as soon as the parties have demonstrated the necessary political will, cooperation and flexibility, as called for in paragraph 7 above;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts with the parties to break the impasse blocking the implementation of the Settlement Plan, and to submit a report to the Council by 31 August 1996 on the outcome of his efforts;

13. Also requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely informed of all significant developments, including their humanitarian aspects, and to submit a comprehensive report on the implementation of this resolution by 10 November 1996;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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A/50/962
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28 May 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda items 55 and 112
QUESTION OF CYPRUS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 23 May 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 23 May 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 55 and 112, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-13322 (E) 300596 310596

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ANNEX

Letter dated 23 May 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ addressed to the Secretary-General

It appears that the Greek Cypriot Mission, in a letter addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/50/958-S/1996/352 dated 15 May 1996), repeated the allegations regarding the "sale" of a Byzantine church in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, already published by them as a press release on 13 May 1996. In this connection, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the Greek Cypriot side is blatantly distorting the advertisement published on this subject in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Today on 6 April 1996. I wish to point out that the advertisement refers to a leasehold, not a "sale" as the Greek Cypriot side claims.

The leasing of the Church of Panagia Chrysotrimithiotissa in the village of Edremit in northern Cyprus is part of the efforts of the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to protect and preserve the artistic and architectural heritage of the land regardless of its cultural origin. This is fully in line with the Charter of Venice drawn up in 1964 and the Amsterdam Declaration issued by the Congress on the European Architectural Heritage in October 1975. The Declaration states, inter alia, that local authorities should afford functions to buildings which, whilst respecting their character, correspond to the needs of contemporary life and thus ensure their survival.

Furthermore, a report specifically prepared on the cultural heritage in both parts of Cyprus in July 1989 by the Committee on Culture and Education of the Council of Europe stated, in its paragraph 5.3 on protection of abandoned property, that it had been general Council of Europe policy for some time to urge reuse of redundant religious buildings. That was reasserted as recently as last May in the Assembly when it adopted resolution 916.

The practice of putting historic buildings to contemporary use, either through leasing or in other ways, is not uncommon on the Greek Cypriot side. A case in point is the Monastery of Archangel Michael, located in the village of Monagri in south Cyprus. The building which was little more than a ruin in 1987, was restored with foreign help and expertise and was turned into an art gallery and an art hostel, in which artists could live and work.

The Chrysotrimithiotissa church in northern Cyprus was restored by the leaseholder in 1992, fully respecting its original character, with the approval and under the strict observation of the Department of Antiquities and Museums of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the "Evkaf" (Religious Endowment) in whose possession the property is.

The building is currently being used as an arts and crafts gallery, for exhibitions by local artists and as a place where Shakespeare's plays are read and discussed. It should be stressed that the use of the church and its premises, either by the current or any future leaseholder, is subject to the express written approval of the Evkaf Endowment.

As for the Greek Cypriot claim of ownership of the property, such claims do not take into account the historical background of the Cyprus conflict or the current legal and political realities prevailing in the island. Nor do they take into account the agreed principles of the bi-zonality and bi-communality of a future federal settlement. Since, however, this is among the topics of discussion at the intercommunal talks as part of a comprehensive settlement, I will not enter into polemics with the Greek Cypriot side on this issue. Suffice it to say that the Greek Cypriot propaganda we are witnessing on this subject is clearly a product of the distorted mentality that Cyprus as a whole, both the south and the north, is exclusively Greek!

It was in this chauvinistic mentality that the Greek Cypriots destroyed 109 mosques, shrines and other places of Muslim worship across the island during the ethnic and cultural "cleansing" campaign of the Greek Cypriot side between 1963-1974. Among the casualties of this campaign of destruction was the historic Cami-i Cedit Mosque in the town of Paphos, which was completely razed to the ground and turned into a car park, as also indicated in the aforementioned Council of Europe report.

It is unfortunate that, in spite of its above record and at a time when it should come to the table for the achievement of a just and viable settlement through negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side is immersed in a counterproductive campaign of propaganda, undermining even further the chances for a negotiated settlement. Its well-known allegations on the demographic structure of Cyprus, again repeated in the Greek Cypriot representative's letter, must be viewed in the context of this campaign of deceitful propaganda and mispresentation. Since these allegations have been amply refuted in my succersive previous communications, I need not deal with them again in detail. I would merely like to reiterate that it has always been the Greek Cypriot side which attempted to change the bi-communal character of the island by eradicating its Turkish Cypriot element in the previously mentioned campaign of ethnic and cultural cleansing, since 1963.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 55 and 112, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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A/50/963
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28 May 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 24 May 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 23 May 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-13328 (E) 300596 310596

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ANNEX

Letter dated 23 May 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 29 April 1996 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations, which contains allegations regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic" (A/50/949-S/1996/331 dated 2 May 1996).

I would like to recall that previous similar allegations were rejected in toto in my successive communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 6 May 1996 (A/50/955-S/1996/348, annex, of 13 May 1996). Since the present Greek Cypriot charges are no more credible or valid than those previously made, I merely wish to reiterate that flights within the airspace of northern Cyprus are with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot usurpers of the seat of government have no jurisdiction or right of say.

The reason behind the Greek Cypriot side's endless barrage of allegations regarding this or similar other subjects is clearly to cover up its intensive militarization campaign in the south, as part of the so-called "joint defence doctrine" with Greece. It is noteworthy that, in the context of the said scheme, the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece have recently carried out joint military exercises code-named "Toxotis" (Bow), held in and around south Cyprus. A-7 and F-16 warplanes and frigates from the Greek air and naval forces, in addition to the Greek Cypriot National Guard, took part in these exercises.

The following statement made by Lt. Colonel Venetis of the Greek Air Force, who participated in these exercises, encapsulates the provocative and aggressive posture of the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front. The statement appeared in the Greek Cypriot press on 12 May 1996:

> "For us each and every corner of Cyprus is like the corner of our Aegean, our Thrace. The Greek Air Force personnel consider the airspace of Cyprus as an extension of the Greek airspace. We are in a position to reach within the shortest period of time any spot and whichever target we want on the territory, sea and skies of the Great Island" (meaning Cyprus).

Furthermore, it was also reported in the Greek Cypriot press of 9 May 1996, on the eve of the said joint manoeuvres, that within the context of the so-called "joint defence doctrine", Greece had decided to grant the Greek Cypriot administration 50 more tanks. Subsequently, the Greek Cypriot daily newspaper Simerini of 16 May 1996 reported that, together with the acquisition of 50 AMX-30B2 and 50 I80Y tanks, new personnel would also be enlisted in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. According to the paper, at least 1,000 additional professional soldiers were soon to join the Greek Cypriot National Guard for a duration of five years.

This military build-up on the Greek Cypriot side, coupled with belligerent statements emanating from Greece and south Cyprus, leaves no room for doubt that the ultimate aim of the so-called "joint defence doctrine" is to seek a military solution to the Cyprus question.

In view of the foregoing, I trust that the international community will do everything it can to persuade the Greek Cypriot side not to continue on this dangerous path and to join the Turkish Cypriot side at the table in the search for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question through dialogue and negotiation.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

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S/1996/385
28 May 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 28 May 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning repeated Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and Israeli practices there, I have the honour to notify you of a series of Israeli attacks that took place during the first half of May 1996.

7 May 1996

The hills of Mlita and Jabal Safi and the environs of Mlikh in the Ayn al-Tuffah area came under Israeli artillery bombardment.

9 May 1996

Mlikh, Luwayzah and the Zahrani river area came under Israeli artillery bombardment, and Israeli warplanes made low-altitude overflights in the Nabatiyah area.

12 May 1996

At 0900 hours the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju', Luwayzah and Mlikh came under Israeli artillery bombardment, and Israeli warplanes made low-altitude overflights in the Nabatiyah area.

At 1110 hours Israeli warplanes carried out four successive attacks on the environs of Ayn Bu Siwar and the Mlita hills and fired a number of rockets.

At 1800 hours, the following were apprehended by elements manning an improvised checkpoint set up by the Israeli forces on the Arnun-Yuhmur road: Muhammad Khalil Fiqh from Kafr Tibnit; Husayn Kamal Hayik from Kafr Tibnit; Qasim Muhammad Nasir Aliq from Yuhmur al-Shaqif.

14 May 1996

At 0845 hours the environs of Jabba' and Ayn Bu Siwar and the hills of Mlita and Jabal Safi came under Israeli artillery bombardment.

At 1230 the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Luwayzah came under Israeli artillery bombardment, and Israeli warplanes made low-altitude overflights in the Nabatiyah area.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns these repeated Israeli attacks, which have caused enormous damage to property. It further condemns in the strongest terms the arbitrary practices against civilians. Like previous attacks, this new series constitutes a blatant breach of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and a violation of international law and fundamental human rights.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/386
29 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DJIBOUTI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to today's debate on Liberia in the Security Council. I was inscribed to participate in the debate; however, I regret to be unable to return to New York in time. I would appreciate, therefore, if the statement that I would have delivered, had I been there, could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Roble OLHAYE

96-13383 (E) 300596 310596

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Annex

Statement on the situation in Liberia to be presented to the Security Council on 28 May 1996 by the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations

At the outset I wish to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We are confident of your skills and experience; no doubt, the Council is in good hands.

We also wish to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Juan Somavia of Chile for successfully and capably guiding the work of the Council last month.

The ongoing crisis in Liberia has undoubtedly major implications for the deprived people of Liberia, for its neighbours who sacrificed so much, for Africa and for the international community at large, in particular, the United Nations Security Council. The initiative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) in 1990, following the failure by the international community to intervene in Liberia's civil war, was hailed as "the regional answer to a regional problem". The African peace-keeping force, ECOMOG, however weakened, demoralized and even despised, remains the only viable recourse. There is perhaps little peace to keep. But the obligation to stay the course is even more compelling. ECOWAS has so far resisted all pressures to pull out entirely; for the original motivation to intervene - "not to watch Liberia disintegrate and destabilize the region" - is even more valid than ever before. Liberia's interim Head of State, Wilton Sankawulo, reaffirmed his faith in ECOWAS when he made this appeal last week:

> "Our message is that we are here to work with ECOWAS in order to bring peace to this country. We have already given instructions to the peace-keepers to take charge of the city of Monrovia, in fact of the whole country."

The latest plunge into chaos, carnage and destruction was perhaps avoidable, were it not the familiar factional greed in attempting to assert political control and authority over Monrovia - the symbol of power and legitimacy.

There is an old expression which says that "men will always be reasonable - when they have tried everything else". Can we doubt that, with regard to Liberia, we have tried everything else? Now, after nearly six years of conflict, some 13 peace accords, 3 interim Governments and a commendable regional peace-keeping initiative, what must be done remains clear, as are the roles which the various parties involved, or not involved, must play. The seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Liberia and that of UNOMIL (S/1996/362) draws similar conclusions.

The Liberian tragedy has turned out to be far more than simply another "African descent into chaos". True, at the heart of the conflict lies distrust, if not hatred, a legacy of mutual victimization and marked warlord power grabs, all which have contributed to the failures of the series of peace processes.

For without a firm and a lasting cease-fire, credible disarmament and demobilization, factions, even subfactions, retain the power to dictate the terms and pace of peace and security in Liberia.

But a closer examination of the situation seems to reveal a wider field of involvement than the Liberian factions alone. Significant regional, international and linguistic rivalries are being contested in Liberia, power plays which supersede local factional tensions. Past allusions to this wider scenario, as it applied to ECOMOG, raised questions regarding its neutrality. This provided a ready excuse for hesitation and even non-compliance for some factions.

The fact is that ECOMOG's six-year effort is both unique and commendable. Without it, one can only wonder where Liberia would be today; whether any peace effort at all would have been possible. Even allusions to recent unrest and turmoil in Monrovia as signs of ECOMOG's demise as an effective deterrent are unfair. For ECOMOG has maintained law and order in Monrovia since 1990. Maintaining law and order is a tall order, and that is why United Nations forces too often shy away from such basic tasks under the pretext of lack of the right mandate. This, though, is what ECOMOG has been doing for years in Monrovia. Its collaboration with the United Nations is a first - a subregional peace initiative in conjunction with the world body. But the participating nations of ECOWAS no longer have the resources to continue the effort alone. ECOMOG is in shambles. Its morale is low, it is underfunded, ill-equipped and undermanned. If ECOMOG is recognized as "key to the process of restoring peace" in Liberia, it needs to refurbish its chaotic finances as well as to enhance its capacity to be able not only to revive the peace deal but also to implement it. The United States of America, given its historical role in Liberia, perhaps bears a special responsibility.

With proper strength, equipment and training, ECOMOG could be an effective force and could undertake meaningful disarmament which in the end may bring about a semblance of peace and security without which elections and government are not possible. For the whole period the war had been raging in Liberia, the international community chose to adopt a "hands-off" approach. It avoided direct engagement in the war and it also failed to provide a consistent and a meaningful backing to the African peace-keeping initiative. This highlights a paradox. The cost in humanitarian aid is already over $500 million and the cost of reconstructing the country is mind-boggling. A fraction of that could have gone to the peace-keepers and perhaps by now peace would be within our reach. It is so often the case to rush to treat the disease rather than cure it. Had ECOWAS decided at its summit last August to withdraw its force, the consequences would have been greater humanitarian tragedy and full-scale war across the country, with the potential to suck the region into its whirlpool. Even now, the humanitarian disaster is horrendous, from the number and condition of displaced persons, refugees, the sick and homeless, rampant disease, hunger and destruction to death. The long-term effects are hard to imagine for nationhood, development and viability.

There appears to be no alternative to a strong involvement by the international community. It cannot pretend its ignorance of the reality in Liberia. This is a conflict which preceded United Nations operations like Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia. The effort to wash one's hands of direct involvement, to leave it to underfunded "proxies", to hope it would just go away, has not worked! Liberia remains - it is not going away! And as long as this is so, the responsibility lies in this room. The Liberian crisis not only remains, it is certain to haunt us all.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/387
29 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 MAY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, in conformity with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996, to inform him of the measures taken by the United Kingdom to implement the provisions in that paragraph.

The Government of the United Kingdom asked the Government of the Sudan on 20 May 1996 to reduce the number of its diplomats at the Sudanese Embassy in London by three, including a Minister-Counsellor. The Government of the Sudan has been given one month to comply with this request. Sudanese diplomats remaining in London will be required to notify the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of all intended journeys outside the Greater London area. The Government of the United Kingdom has also decided to refuse to grant visas to members of the Government of the Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces until further notice, subject only to rare compassionate exceptions.

96-13371 (E) 300596 310596

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/388
29 May 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 MAY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SPAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in reply to his note of 15 May 1996, has the honour to inform him that the Government of Spain, in compliance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996), has instructed all diplomatic missions and consulates of Spain abroad to deny visas for entry into and transit through Spanish territory to members of the Government of the Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces, with effect from 10 May 1996. These measures will remain in effect for as long as the Sudan persists in its attitude of non-compliance with the demands made in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Since the Sudan has no diplomatic mission in Spain and Spain has no embassy in the Sudan, subparagraph 3 (a) of resolution 1054 (1996) does not apply.

96-13377 (E) 300596 300596 310596

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/389
29 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Please find enclosed the letter signed by H.E. Dr. Ljubomir Frckovski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, dated 8 April 1996, concerning the UNPREDEP mission in the Republic of Macedonia.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Slobodan TASOVSKI
Deputy Permanent Representative

96-13461 (E) 290596 300596

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Annex

Letter dated 8 April 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia addressed to the Secretary-General

First of all allow me to express my satisfaction with the definite establishment of UNPREDEP as a fully independent peace-keeping mission in the Republic of Macedonia, headed by Mr. Henryk Sokalski, Your Excellency's Special Representative.

Highly appreciating Your Excellency's involvement ever since the very start of this extraordinarily successful preventive peace-keeping operation of the United Nations in the Republic of Macedonia, I rest convinced that you will stipulate the continuation of its mandate for another 12 months in your forthcoming report to the Security Council.

I believe that the unambiguously positive assessment by the Security Council and by numerous factors of the international community, expressed thus far with regard to the successful realization of the UNPREDEP peace-keeping mission, indeed represents solid grounds for the continuation of its mandate.

I am sure you will share my opinion that, unfortunately, the situation in the region has not changed to the extent that would warrant the completion of the mission by 30 May of this year. Permit me to recall a few well-known facts and assessments in confirmation of the foregoing:

- It cannot be doubted that the Dayton Agreement has represented a success in ceasing war conflicts, first and foremost in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this period of full implementation of the Agreement shall be definitely sensitive and shall be exposed to risks and complications. UNPREDEP, as a proven factor of stability, is of tremendous importance in support of the peace processes within the area of the crisis and wider, having in mind its complexity and the intricacy of the ethnic and religious composition of the region.

- The potential threats for the Republic of Macedonia imposed by the expansion of the crisis have not been overcome yet, bearing also in mind the issue of Kosovo, in our immediate neighbourhood. Tensions and the possible complications are still present in the very area of UNPREDEP's operation. The northern border of the Republic of Macedonia is still not mutually demarcated, despite the efforts of my Government in this regard.

- The Republic of Macedonia, not by its own fault, has remained with a significantly reduced defensive capability. This is the consequence of the withdrawal of all armament and military equipment following the departure of the former Yugoslav People's Army from our State, as well as the result of the Security Council arms embargo. The establishment of an appropriate defence system incorporated in collective security arrangements (NATO) and the definite formulation of a defence policy based on the principles of civil control of military forces and on a democratic political system are our permanent commitment. Our difficult economic situation which to a large extent has been

affected by United Nations sanctions and the unilateral embargo of the recent past, shall take a longer time in order to establish an adequate defence system. The continuation of UNPREDEP's mandate in the Republic of Macedonia is also important because of the concern of the United Nations and the international community at large with the establishment of an environment favourable to strengthening the stability of a country that has proven itself an important factor of peace and stability in the region.

- The Republic of Macedonia is a country with ethnic and religious diversity. As such it has proven its ability to develop as a stable democratic State, an equal partner in the international community, full-fledged member of most important international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The Mission of UNPREDEP, which in coordination with OSCE, has established an exceptional cooperation with all the important entities in our country, has greatly contributed to the process of establishing democratic structures in the Republic of Macedonia and to the realization of its policy of good-neighbourliness. In this regard, UNPREDEP strengthens the reputation and influence of both the United Nations and the international community among the broad public with regard to the observance of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the international standards for human rights in a specific situation.

I shall be grateful to Your Excellency for making this letter available to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ljubomir FRCKOVSKI
Minister

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/390
29 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the identical letters dated 29 February 1996 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the President of the Republic of Cameroon and to the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (S/1996/150). In those letters, the President of the Council stated that the members welcomed my proposal to the parties that I should send a fact-finding mission to the Bakassi peninsula, urged the two Governments concerned to cooperate fully with this mission, and requested me to continue to monitor this matter closely and to report to the Council.

In pursuit of this mandate, I dispatched my Special Envoy, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, to the region in order to consult with the Heads of State of the two countries concerned. Mr. Brahimi held a number of meetings with the two leaders between 9 and 16 May 1996. He has reported to me that President Paul Biya of Cameroon stressed that his country would abide by any decision reached by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and would welcome any action by the United Nations, including the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to the disputed area and to the region. President Biya also suggested that some United Nations military observers be stationed in the area to help prevent any renewed confrontation.

The Head of State of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, while indicating his preference for a bilateral solution to the dispute, recognized that a mission of the United Nations could help in this regard. In a letter to me dated 12 May 1996, General Abacha indicated his awareness that the ICJ had urged the two countries to lend assistance to a United Nations mission to Bakassi and said that, in deference to this order, the Government of Nigeria accepted in principle the idea of such a mission. He added that he would shortly be writing to me and to the Security Council with a detailed response to this proposal. Finally, he reiterated his personal desire to find an amicable solution to the Bakassi dispute in the best African tradition and in a brotherly manner and would welcome any offer to assist in that regard.

I shall keep the Security Council informed of any further developments on this subject. In the meantime, I should be grateful if you could bring the contents of this letter to the attention of its members.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/391
29 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MAY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I thank you for your letter of 24 May 1996 (S/1996/390), the contents of which have been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Council request you to continue to keep them informed of the measures you are able to take to monitor the situation in the Bakassi peninsula, following the letters of the President of the Council of 29 February 1996 (S/1996/150) and bearing in mind the Order of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures on the matter issued on 15 March 1996.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
President of the Security Council

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/392
29 May 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

France, Germany, Italy, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and in particular its resolutions 1027 (1995) of 30 November 1995 and 1046 (1996) of 13 February 1996,

Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Noting with appreciation the important role played by the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability and paying tribute to its personnel in the performance of their mandate,

Noting that the security situation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has improved, but recognizing that it is too early to be confident that stability has been established in the region and expressing the hope that future developments in the region will not undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its security,

Welcoming the signing of the agreement between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 8 April 1996 (S/1996/291, annex) and urging both parties to implement it in full, including the demarcation of their mutual border,

Welcoming also the progress achieved in improving relations between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece on the basis of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (S/1995/794, annex I),

Further welcoming the close cooperation between UNPREDEP and the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Taking note of the letter of the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Secretary-General of 11 April 1996 (S/1996/389),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 May 1996 (S/1996/373 and Add.1) and in particular his assessment of the composition, strength and mandate of UNPREDEP,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 May 1996;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for a period terminating on 30 November 1996;

3. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably requests by the Secretary-General for necessary assistance to UNPREDEP in the performance of its mandate;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of any developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate and further requests the Secretary-General to review the composition, strength and mandate of UNPREDEP and to report to the Council by 30 September 1996 for its consideration;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/393
30 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 23 May 1996 (S/1996/368),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 30 November 1996;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on the development in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

96-13580 (E) 300596 310596

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/394
30 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Liberia, in particular resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January 1996,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 21 May 1996 (S/1996/362) on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),

Stressing that the escalating violence is in violation of the Abuja Agreement (S/1995/742, annex) and puts the peace process at grave risk,

Firmly convinced of the importance of Monrovia as a safe haven, and noting especially the recent broader deployment of ECOMOG in the city,

Emphasizing once again that the people of Liberia and their leaders bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving peace and national reconciliation,

Commending the positive role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia,

Noting the adoption of a Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement by the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers on 7 May 1996,

Expressing its appreciation to those African States that have contributed and are contributing troops to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),

Commending also those Member States that have supported the peace process and ECOMOG, including through contributions to the Trust Fund for Liberia,

Stressing also that the presence of UNOMIL in Liberia is predicated on the presence of ECOMOG and its commitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL military observers and civilian staff,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 21 May 1996;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until 31 August 1996;

3. Recognizes that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground warranted the Secretary-General's decision to temporarily reduce the strength of UNOMIL;

4. Notes the Secretary-General's intention to maintain UNOMIL deployments at their present level and requests that he advise the Security Council of any significant planned increase in the number of personnel deployed depending on the evolution of the security situation on the ground;

5. Expresses its grave concern at the collapse of the cease-fire, the resumption of hostilities and the spread of fighting into the previously safe area of Monrovia and its environs;

6. Condemns all attacks against personnel of ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and international organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance as well as the looting of their equipment, supplies and personal property, and calls for the immediate return of looted property;

7. Demands once more that the factions in Liberia strictly respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel, as well as international organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Liberia, and further demands that these factions facilitate such deliveries and that they strictly abide by the relevant rules of international humanitarian law;

8. Calls upon the Liberian parties to implement fully and expeditiously all the agreements and commitments they have already entered into, in particular the Abuja Agreement, and in this regard demands that they restore an effective and comprehensive cease-fire, withdraw all fighters and arms from Monrovia, allow the deployment of ECOMOG, and restore Monrovia as a safe haven;

9. Stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including the participation of UNOMIL, is contingent on the Liberian parties' demonstrating their commitment to resolve their differences peacefully and on the fulfilment of the conditions set out in paragraph 8;

10. Stresses the importance of respect for human rights in Liberia;

11. Recalls the obligation of all States to comply strictly with the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia imposed by resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992 and to bring all instances of violations of the embargo before the Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April 1995;

12. Encourages the members of ECOWAS in preparation for their summit to consider ways and means to strengthen ECOMOG and to persuade the faction leaders to resume the peace process;

13. Urges all Member States to provide financial, logistical and other assistance in support of ECOMOG to enable it to carry out its mandate;

14. Calls on ECOMOG, in accordance with the agreement regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272) and with the UNOMIL concept of operations, to provide for the security of UNOMIL observers and civilian staff;

15. Expresses support for the resolve of the ECOWAS Ministers not to recognize any Government in Liberia that comes to office through the use of force;

16. Urges Member States to continue to provide additional support for the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Security Council closely informed of the situation in Liberia, and expresses its readiness, if the situation further deteriorates, to consider possible measures against those who do not cooperate with the resumption of the peace process;

18. Decides to remain seized of the matter.